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Abstract: Should conciliating with disagreeing peers be considered sufficient for reaching rational beliefs? 
Thomas Kelly argues that when taken this way, Conciliationism lets those who enter into a disagreement 
with an irrational belief reach a rational belief all too easily. Three kinds of responses defending 
Conciliationism are found in the literature. One response has it that conciliation is required only of agents 
who have a rational belief as they enter into a disagreement. This response yields a requirement that no 
one should follow. If the need to conciliate applies only to already rational agents, then an agent must 
conciliate only when her peer is the one irrational. A second response views conciliation as merely 
necessary for having a rational belief. This alone does little to address the central question of what is 
rational to believe when facing a disagreeing peer. Attempts to develop the response either reduce to the 
first response, or deem necessary an unnecessary doxastic revision, or imply that rational dilemmas 
obtain in cases where intuitively there are none. A third response tells us to weigh what our pre-
disagreement evidence supports against the evidence from the disagreement itself. This invites epistemic 
akrasia.  
 
1 Introduction 
According to Conciliationism, one must revise one’s view upon meeting an epistemic 
peer who has a different view.1 The further a peer’s view is from one’s own, the greater 
the revision required. On a graded doxastic framework, many understand 
Conciliationism as requiring both parties to revise their respective credences in the 
direction of their peer’s credence. 
                                                
1  Many authors, at some point or another, have defended versions of this view. A representative sample includes 
Christensen (2007), Elga (2007), Feldman (2007), and Cohen (2013).  
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 Thomas Kelly (2010, 2014) worries that Conciliationism makes it too easy to have 
fully rational doxastic attitudes. The argument follows a simple recipe. First, take an 
agent who has an irrational credence in a proposition p. Then, introduce that agent to a 
peer who disagrees. Finally, per Conciliationism, have the agent conciliate to some 
extent. And there you have it: the agent is now rational in having the credence that she 
does in p. The problem is most vivid when both agents start out with irrational 
credences, and end up with rational ones by conciliating with each other. Let us follow 
Kelly in referring to this as the Easy Bootstrapping argument (EB).2 EB shows that an 
intuitive understanding of Conciliationism, on which the rationally required credence is 
always the one we reach by conciliating from our initial credence, appears to allow for 
unacceptably easy formation of rational attitudes.3 Call this intuitive understanding 
Naïve Conciliationism:  
 
Naïve Conciliationism: If one has credence c1 in p, and one encounters a peer 
who has a different credence c2 in p, then rationality requires that one 
conciliate to an intermediate credence c3. 
 
 Attempts to defend Conciliationism from a bootstrapping charge fit into a few 
                                                
2  Weatherson (ms.) names this phenomenon “epistemic laundering.”  
3  There is a background assumption here that if a credence is rationally required, then having it (in the proper 
way) is both necessary and sufficient in order to have a rational doxastic attitude. This assumption will be called 
into question later on (in section 3), but note that it is not unreasonable. A credence that is sufficient but not 
necessary for believing rationally would not be genuinely required. A credence that is necessary but not 
sufficient for believing rationally would be irrational to have, which would make rationality require irrationality.  
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categories.4 These attempts either (1) restrict the need to conciliate only to agents who 
have a rational credence as they enter into a disagreement, or (2) take Conciliationism to 
be a necessary constraint on rational credences rather than a sufficient one, or (3) 
require that we weigh what our pre-disagreement evidence supports against the 
evidence that the disagreement brings. I argue that the resulting conciliatory views are 
all unpromising. Restricting the need to conciliate only to agents who have rational 
credences ensures that Conciliationism is entirely concerned with misleading those 
agents whose views are rational. This gives the exact opposite outcome to the one we 
were hoping to get out of a conciliatory strategy, namely, to help mitigate the mistakes 
that we make. As such, there are reasons to think that if this restricted version is what 
Conciliationism amounts to, no one should follow its directives. Alternatively, 
understanding Conciliationism as a mere necessary condition for having a rational 
credence is not enough, as it fails to tell us what rationality requires in cases of 
disagreement. Importantly, natural ways of fleshing out the corresponding requirement 
have unwanted implications: either they deem necessary a doxastic move that is 
sometimes unnecessary, or they effectively reduce to the restricting response, or they 
give rise to rational dilemmas in cases where there do not seem to be any. Lastly, 
requiring that agents weigh what their pre-disagreement evidence supports against the 
evidence introduced by the disagreement makes for a rule that we may not rationally 
believe we followed. Consequently, the rule cements the very kind of doxastic tension 
that Conciliationism was called to resolve—where we hold a belief despite good reason 
for thinking that the belief is irrational. An attempt to bite this bullet leads to a 
                                                
4  EB is an application of the infamous detaching problem to Naïve Conciliationism. As a result, some of the possible 
solutions resemble familiar ones in the normative detaching debate. See Broom (1999), Finlay (2010).  
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contradiction. 
 
2 Conciliationism as restricted to the initially rational 
While discussing a paradigmatic version of Conciliationism—the Equal Weight View—
Brian Weatherson (ms.) proposes we restrict the view in order to sidestep EB:5  
 
Consider an agent who makes an irrational judgment. And assume her friend, who she 
knows to be a peer, makes the same irrational judgment. What does the Equal Weight 
View say she should do? It should be bad for it to say that she should regard her and her 
friend as equally likely to be right, so she should keep this judgment. After all, it was 
irrational! There are a couple of moves the friend of the Equal Weight View can make at 
this point. But I think the simplest one will be to put some kind of restriction on Equal 
Weight… to agents who have initially made rational judgments… (Weatherson ms., p. 5) 
 
Weatherson suggests that we understand Conciliationism as requiring conciliation with 
a peer only when we have a rational credence. With this restriction, when we start out 
irrational, we are neither required to conciliate nor guaranteed to become rational by 
conciliating.6 So the restriction successfully blocks EB. 
 A conciliatory rule based on Weatherson’s suggestion would look something like 
the following: 
                                                
5  Following Elga (2007), Weatherson takes the Equal Weight View to require that we give equal weight to each 
participant’s stance in a peer disagreement. 
6  Here and throughout, let “agents who have a rational credence/belief” mean the same as “rational agents.” By 
these I mean to refer to agents whose relevant doxastic attitudes are rationally had, i.e., agents who are 
doxastically justified. When I mean to discuss propositional justification, I talk of the credences/beliefs that the 
evidence supports or justifies.  
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Restricted Conciliationism: If one rationally has credence c1 in p, and one 
encounters a peer who has a different credence c2 in p, then rationality 
requires one to conciliate to an intermediate credence c3. 
 
Restricted Conciliationism allows agents to reach a rational credence by conciliating, 
but only when those agents have a rational credence in the first place. Since the rule’s 
requirement does not bind agents who enter into a disagreement with an irrational 
credence, such agents would not necessarily reach a rational credence by conciliating.7  
 Soon after raising EB, Kelly (2010) argues against restricting Conciliationism as a 
solution: 
 
If the phenomenon of peer disagreement requires you to split the difference with my 
unreasonable opinion, why should I be spared having to split the difference with your 
reasonable opinion simply in virtue of having botched the evidence in the first place? 
                                                
7  Cohen (2013) is sympathetic to such a restriction in response to bootstrapping worries, but also entertains a way 
for the initially irrational to conciliate to a fully rational credence. Cohen suggests that if the initially irrational 
agent reflects on her general rationality, her irrational credence could gain enough merit so as to justify 
conciliation from that credence. By stipulation, the agent should give her peer’s view significant evidential 
weight, and both agents enjoy equal epistemic status. So, the thought goes, the agent should give her own view 
significant weight as well.  
  There are places to resist this suggestion. For example, Kelly (2014) argues that it would allow for “even 
easier, more implausible bootstrapping.” The idea is that if rationality requires us to spread the evidential weight 
across the views of all peers involved, then when only a single peer is involved (i.e., pre-disagreement), her view 
would get all the evidential weight. In other words, whatever view the agent happens to form before 
encountering disagreement would be (at least propositionally) justified. Whether or not this is enough to reject 
Cohen’s suggestion, it seems to show that the conciliatory move itself would be required only when the agent is 
at a rational credence. Thus, Cohen’s approach looks like a version of Restricted Conciliationism rather than an 
alternative to it. 
 6 
 
Whatever normative pressure is created by the phenomenon of peer disagreement, 
surely one does not immunize oneself against that pressure simply in virtue of having 
beliefs that are not adequately supported by one’s evidence. (Kelly 2010, p. 128) 
 
But the restricting response to EB is not so easily dismissed. The response is not 
committed to disagreement putting no pressure on irrational agents. Rather, it is silent 
about what disagreement means for irrational agents, and speaks only to what rational 
agents should do to maintain their rationality. One could accept the restricted version 
of Conciliationism and also maintain that disagreement puts additional pressure on 
irrational agents to revise, beyond the pressure that such agents are already under from 
their pre-disagreement evidence. Nevertheless, there is something in the neighborhood 
of Kelly’s argument against restricting Conciliationism that proponents of the 
restriction should worry about.  
 To get a feel for the problem with Restricted Conciliationism, consider a safety 
requirement to wear a helmet when riding a bike. Presumably, the only ones who 
benefit from wearing a helmet are those who will suffer an accident. Since we do not 
know in advance who will suffer an accident, we think that everyone should wear one. 
Suppose that someone suggested that the requirement to wear a helmet applied only to 
those who were not going to suffer an accident. Such a suggestion would be absurd. It 
would get the motivation for wearing a helmet precisely backwards. If we think that 
those who will suffer an accident need not wear a helmet, it would be hard to explain 
why anyone else should. So if we want to avoid the result that no one should wear a 
helmet, we should reject the suggestion. Analogously, if there is any motivation for us 
to conciliate with our disagreeing peers, it comes from those cases where we are the 
ones irrational. But Restricted Conciliationism, oddly, requires conciliation only of 
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rational agents. 
 Conciliationism appears to go awry when it excludes the initially irrational from 
having to conciliate. The thought should come naturally to those who share David 
Christensen’s (2007) view regarding the good news about the conciliatory strategy: 
 
The fact of disagreement is old, but bad, news; it is bad because it indicates the relatively 
benighted conditions under which we work. But adjusting our beliefs in the direction of 
those peers with whom we disagree should be welcomed as a valuable strategy for 
coping with our known infirmities. (Christensen 2007, p. 216) 
 
If only the initially rational must conciliate, the news that Conciliationism brings is not 
good at all. Rather than help us cope with our known infirmities, Restricted 
Conciliationism stays silent about what we should do when those infirmities lead us 
astray, while ensuring that our peers’ infirmities lead us astray too. If Conciliationism is 
to be any kind of good news, it cannot reserve the need to conciliate exclusively for the 
initially rational. The motivation for such a view is hopelessly missing. Call this 
accusation No Motivation. 
 Like Kelly’s argument against Restricted Conciliationism, No Motivation also 
focuses on the fact that the view leaves out irrational agents. However, unlike the 
former, No Motivation is not concerned with whether Restricted Conciliationism lets 
irrational agents survive disagreement unaffected. Rather, the concern is the 
irrationality of our disagreeing interlocutors whenever the rule applies to us. Thus, No 
Motivation seems to rest on the claim that in a peer disagreement, if one peer believes 
rationally, the other does not: 
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Someone’s Irrational: When two peers disagree, at least one of them believes 
irrationally. 
 
 I discuss Someone’s Irrational soon. But first, note an unusual implication of 
Restricted Conciliationism. Suppose that we come to know that Restricted 
Conciliationism is a genuine rule of rationality, and we wonder whether we followed it 
correctly in a given disagreement. If we may rationally believe that we followed it 
correctly, we may also rationally believe that our peer’s credence was the irrational 
one—for the former entails the latter on the assumption of Someone’s Irrational. At that 
point we would find ourselves in an unstable doxastic position; believing that we 
changed our view due to a peer’s irrational view. We would then have to roll back 
whatever conciliatory revision we made due to Restricted Conciliationism. So, we get 
the bizarre result that we cannot rationally believe that we responded to disagreement 
correctly while maintaining the conciliated view. The rule is inconsistent with rationally 
believing that we followed it.8 
 The result is more than a quirk of Restricted Conciliationism. It ought to make us 
wonder who should maintain the rule’s recommended credence, if not agents who 
rationally believe that they followed the rule correctly. Agents who disbelieve or 
suspend judgment about whether they followed the rule correctly would make for poor 
                                                
8  This kind of inconsistency does not arise with other, similarly restricted rules. Suppose, for instance, that we 
wonder whether something like Modus Ponens is a rule of rationality. No one should think that if we irrationally 
believe p and also irrationally believe that if p then q, it would be rational for us to believe q (see Harman (1986)). 
But a restricted version of Modus Ponens to those who rationally believe p and if p then q gets the right result, 
and with no worry of inconsistency. We could come to rationally believe that we followed the rule correctly 
while maintaining its recommended belief q.  
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candidates.9 A major selling point for conciliatory views is that they purport to offer a 
way to resolve the seemingly irrational tension in having a belief and at the same time 
having serious justified doubts that the belief is rational. Indeed, these are the doubts 
that disagreeing peers cause. But agents who follow Restricted Conciliationism and 
suspend about whether they did so correctly would manifest this very tension, as they 
would be quite uncertain that their own belief is rational. Agents who follow the rule 
and disbelieve that they did would fare even worse in this regard. So, since Restricted 
Conciliationism is inconsistent with a rational belief that we followed it correctly, the 
rule would seem to secure the tension that it purports to resolve. 
 Another option is that agents who never consider whether they followed the rule 
correctly are the only ones who should maintain the rule’s recommended credence. This 
option runs into trouble as well. We could encourage these agents to be more reflective, 
and thereby undermine their following the rule. It is implausible that the authority of a 
genuine rule of rationality is contingent on how frequently people consider whether 
their beliefs are rational.10  
 Now, why think that Someone’s Irrational is true? The thought that disagreement 
puts pressure on agents to move away from their initial credences is more compelling 
                                                
9  Others have argued that that both disbelief and suspension about whether we rationally believe p are 
inconsistent with believing p. Horowitz (2014) shows that akratic belief combinations of the sort p, but believing p 
is irrational “license patently bad reasoning and irrational action.” Huemer (2011) and Smithies (2012) take 
suspension about p to license judgments like it may or may not be the case that p, and it is an open question whether p. 
It seems arbitrary to believe p while also believing that it is an open question whether we are justified in believing p. I 
return to this matter in section 4 where a similar issue comes up. 
10  A similar point applies with respect to agents who do not know that Restricted Conciliationism is correct. We 
could inform those agents that it is, and thereby undermine their following it.  
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when disagreement entails that one of the parties involved believes irrationally.11 
Paradigm examples used to promote conciliatory views—like Christensen’s (2007) 
restaurant case—are ones where we know that someone made an error in reasoning. So 
it would be an interesting result of No Motivation if it forced conciliationists to reject 
Someone’s Irrational, because doing so would eliminate much of Conciliationism’s 
intuitive appeal.  
 Someone’s Irrational also follows if we accept a conception of ‘peer’ according to 
which peers share their evidence, and also accept the Uniqueness Thesis: 
 
Uniqueness: Given one’s total evidence, there is a unique rational doxastic 
attitude that one can take to any proposition.12 
 
Kelly (2010) has argued that Conciliationism is committed to Uniqueness.13 But while 
rejecting Uniqueness would be enough to resist Someone’s Irrational, it would not be 
enough to resist No Motivation. If Restricted Conciliationism aims to capture what we 
should do in all possible disagreements, it must be that No Motivation never 
undermines its recommendation. Yet, whenever we would justifiably believe that one of 
the disagreeing peers is irrational, we could use No Motivation as grounds for 
dismissing the recommendation that Restricted Conciliationism makes. So the kind of 
rejection of Uniqueness required to fend off No Motivation would have to deny that we 
are ever justified in believing that one of the disagreeing parties is irrational. Of course, 
                                                
11  It would be enough for present purposes to take disagreement to suggest that at least one of the agents involved 
made an error in reasoning (rather than believes irrationally).  
12  I borrow this formulation from White (2005). 
13  See Kelly (2010), pp. 120-121. Ballantyne and Coffman (2012) discuss the matter in depth. 
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disagreements can arise over very many bodies of evidence, and the opinions involved 
can vary to a great extent. If we are never justified in believing that one of the 
disagreeing parties is irrational, it must be that permissive situations are both 
widespread and highly slack.14 So the brand of Permissivism required for blocking No 
Motivation, if we wish Restricted Conciliationism to apply to all disagreements, is quite 
a radical one. It must maintain that very many bodies of evidence are permissive, and 
that they allow for widely divergent doxastic attitudes.15 
 Another way to reject Someone’s Irrational is to deny that peers share all of their 
relevant evidence. This would allow both disagreeing peers to be rational in cases where 
their respective evidence differs. Even so, such a rejection of Someone’s Irrational would 
not undermine No Motivation in cases where the disagreement persists despite explicit 
sharing of the evidence. So No Motivation is immune to the objection in cases of full 
disclosure.16 This defense of Someone’s Irrational works best on the assumption that an 
agent’s evidence is entirely sharable. But even if our evidence is not always entirely 
sharable, on many occasions it is. If Restricted Conciliationism is to apply as a rule for 
belief revision in all disagreement, it must apply when we know that we share all of our 
                                                
14  By ‘permissive situations’ I mean a situation in which the evidence permits more than one maximally rational 
belief. By ‘Permissivism’ I mean the denial of Uniqueness.  
15  Cohen’s (2013) suggestion (see footnote 7) appears to afford a kind of widespread Permissivism that undermines 
Someone’s Irrational. On that suggestion, the track record of generally rational agents seems to (at least 
propositionally) justify the beliefs that they form. This would make it hard for agents to have irrational beliefs 
when they are generally rational, and similarly hard to rationally believe that either peer has an irrational belief. 
Nonetheless, there are cases in which the disagreeing peers should be confident that one of them indeed has an 
irrational belief. For example, we could inform the agents that one of them has ingested a reason-distorting drug. 
That would ensure that the agents could not appeal to their track record success on the particular occasion.  
16  Feldman (2006) introduces this terminology. 
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evidence with our peers. 
 It is possible to resist No Motivation by further restricting Conciliationism, so as to 
guarantee absence of justification for thinking that some party in the disagreement is 
irrational. Conciliating may thus be taken as required only of initially rational agents 
who lack justification for believing that one of the disagreeing peers is irrational. Such a 
rule would be largely incomplete and suspiciously ad hoc. It is hard enough to grant 
that a rule regarding the correct response to disagreement can leave out all initially 
irrational agents, but that restriction at least has a principled reason behind it. As 
Christensen (2011) notes, there are many ways to be irrational, so expecting one rule to 
account for all possible mistakes may be expecting too much.17 However, it would be 
much harder to justify a restriction that leaves out cases of agents who know they are in 
a disagreement where someone is irrational. Doing so would seem to limit the 
application of Restricted Conciliationism for no other reason than to strategically avoid 
No Motivation, while leaving unanswered the interesting question of how we should 
respond to disagreements when we know that someone is irrational. 
 The attempt to avoid EB by restricting Conciliationism only to the initially rational 
does not look promising. Some of the other attempts to avoid EB end up sharing a lot 
with Restricted Conciliationism, including its problems. Others still face problems of 
their own. I now turn to these attempts.  
 
3 Conciliation as merely necessary 
A simple way around EB involves construing Conciliationism as a view about what is 
necessary for having a rational credence. EB does not gain traction unless we treat 
                                                
17  Christensen (2011), p. 4.  
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conciliation as sufficient for having a rational credence. Kelly (2014) names the construal 
of Conciliationism that exposes it to EB “Strong Conciliationism”: 
 
Strong Conciliationism: An agent’s holding the conciliated opinion is both 
sufficient as well as necessary for her opinion to be fully reasonable or 
justified.18  
 
On strong conciliatory views, conciliating with a disagreeing peer is required of all 
agents, and doing so suffices for reaching rational credences. If instead we interpret 
Conciliationism as imposing just a necessary constraint, conciliating would not 
guarantee a rational credence. Kelly names such an interpretation “Weak 
Conciliationism”: 
 
Weak Conciliationism: A perfectly rational agent would not hold some 
opinion that is out of step with the conciliated opinion.  
 
Weak Conciliationism implies that conciliating with a disagreeing peer is necessary for 
holding a perfectly rational credence. Since it is not committed to conciliation being 
sufficient for holding a rational credence, it does not enable easy bootstrapping. 
 On its own, Weak Conciliationism provides little insight into the epistemic 
significance of peer disagreement. Merely saying that we cannot be perfectly rational as 
long as we are out of step with the conciliated opinion does not tell us what rationality 
requires in peer disagreement situations. But just what we want to know is what 
                                                
18  Notice that dropping the necessity constraint would still leave Strong Conciliationism exposed to EB. 
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rationality requires in peer disagreement situations.19 It is unclear what particular 
conciliatory requirement follows from Weak Conciliationism, and what other rational 
requirements are relevant in this context. In fact, Weak Conciliationism does not even 
tell us whether the perfectly rational agent ever conciliates with her opposition, or 
whether she ever faces peer disagreement.20 So in the absence of a more detailed story, 
the epistemic significance of disagreement remains largely mysterious on this view.  
 Indeed, if Weak Conciliationism is the most we can say about the epistemic 
significance of disagreement then that would be an interesting result (albeit a 
disappointing one). That said, some conciliatory accounts in line with the thought that 
conciliation is only necessary do say more. So, to give the thought due consideration, 
we should look into possible conciliatory accounts in its spirit. 
 One tempting way of developing the thought tells us how disagreement affects what 
is necessary for us to believe rationally: 
 
Necessary Conciliationism: If one has credence c1 in p (given evidence E), and 
one encounters a peer who has a different credence c2 in p (given E), then it 
is necessary for believing rationally that one conciliate to an intermediate 
credence c3. 
 
                                                
19  For example, Adam Elga (2007) asks: “How should you take into account the opinions of an advisor?” David 
Enoch (2010) asks: “How should you update your (degrees of) belief about a proposition when you find out that 
someone else—as reliable as you are in these matters—disagrees with you about its truth value?” Other authors, 
including Christensen (2009), present the question similarly. 
20  One issue here is that it is unclear what the idealization of the agent amounts to exactly. Perhaps the best way to 
conceive of the agent is as one who always believes rationally, but also lacks sufficient evidence to believe that 
she does so. Whether this stipulation is coherent is debatable. See Titelbaum (2015) for reasons to doubt it.   
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According to Necessary Conciliationism, it is necessary that all agents conciliate upon 
meeting a disagreeing peer, if they are to have a rational credence. Since it is only a 
necessary condition for believing rationally, meeting it does not guarantee that all who 
comply end up with rational credences. For the view to avoid EB it must be that the 
initially irrational would remain irrational even if they satisfy the condition. 
 However, the conciliatory move that Necessary Conciliationism claims to be 
necessary sometimes looks entirely unnecessary. Consider the following case: 
 
Fixed Mistakes 
Fixit incorrectly evaluates her evidence E, and irrationally forms credence 
c1 in p. Fixit’s peer correctly evaluates E, and rationally forms the justified 
credence c2 in p. Once the disagreement is revealed, Fixit considers her 
total evidence, correctly judges that it justifies c2, and forms c2 in p based 
on her total evidence. 
 
In Fixed Mistakes, Fixit finds her way to a perfectly rational credence. She arrives at the 
credence justified by her total evidence—the pre-disagreement evidence and the new 
evidence of her peer’s credence—and moreover, she does it by reasoning correctly from 
that total evidence. At no point is it necessary for Fixit to conciliate in the way that 
Necessary Conciliationism demands. So, contra Necessary Conciliationism, conciliating 
from our initial credence is not always necessary for arriving at a rational credence.21   
                                                
21  This objection may join Kelly’s EB in casting doubt on the naïve interpretation of Conciliationism. Both the 
counterexample here and Kelly’s bootstrapping accusation trade on the intuition that we should have the right 
idea of what credence the pre-disagreement evidence supports, before it is the case that rationality requires us to 
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 Two responses to the case suggest themselves, and both rely on the thought that on 
her way to c2 Fixit must be changing her credence in p given the pre-disagreement 
evidence E alone. If this is right, then one way to defend Necessary Conciliationism 
from the counterexample would be to have the rule apply only to agents who have 
reached their final verdicts about p given E. Alternatively, we may say that the 
counterexample misses its mark because as soon as Fixit fixes her irrational credence in 
p given E, the credence that Necessary Conciliationism recommends changes as well. If 
upon considering the total evidence Fixit comes to have c2 in p given E, the rule would 
recommend that she stay at c2. Thus, the case is not a genuine counterexample to the 
rule.22 
 The details of Fixed Mistakes leave it open whether, on her way to c2, Fixit changes 
her credence in p based on the pre-disagreement evidence E alone. If it is possible for 
her to rationally have c2 in p based on the total evidence and without forming a new 
credence in p given E alone, then the counterexample is safe from the two responses. 
But whether or not that is possible, it would be wrong to restrict Necessary 
Conciliationism to agents who have reached their final verdicts about p given E alone. 
Not only is it unclear what reaching such a final verdict amounts to, a conciliatory 
account should have something to tell agents who may one day change their credence 
in p given E alone. 
 The alternative response says that Necessary Conciliationism changes its 
recommendation as soon as Fixit changes her credence in p given E alone. On this 
reading of Necessary Conciliationism, it is necessary for believing rationally that we 
                                                                                                                                                       
do anything with that credence (be that requirement necessary or sufficient for a rational belief). Kelly’s point 
targets the sufficiency claim, whereas Fixed Mistakes could be used against the necessity claim.. 
22  I thank an annonymous Episteme reviewer for this point. 
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conciliate from whatever credence we have in p given E alone, rather than from the 
credence in p that we have when we enter into a disagreement. This reading does not 
escape a more detailed version of Fixed Mistakes. Fixit need not form a new credence in 
p given E in order to end up fully rational. Fixit’s reasoning could proceed via a higher-
order judgment about what E justifies. She could rationally judge that E justifies her 
peer’s credence c2, and based on that plus the fact that the peer is at c2 move to c2 
directly.23  
 Another way to understand the idea that it is necessary to conciliate from whatever 
credence we have in p given E is to take the relevant requirement to be wide-scope. I 
consider such a view next.  
 
3.1  The wide-scope response 
Christensen (2011) offers a possible response to EB that seems to fit well with the 
thought that conciliating is only necessary for believing rationally: 
 
Conciliationism tells us what the proper response is to one particular kind of evidence. 
[…] But having taken correct account of one bit of evidence cannot be equivalent to 
having beliefs that are (even propositionally) rational, all things considered. If one starts 
out by botching things epistemically, and then takes correct account of one bit of 
evidence, it’s unlikely that one will end up with fully rational beliefs. And it would 
surely be asking too much of a principle describing the correct response to peer 
                                                
23  It is possible to defend Necessary Conciliationism from Fixed Mistakes by restricting the rule to agents who do 
not doubt the rationality of their own credence. That would not only be ad hoc, but would also leave 
Concilaitionism silent about what agents who have such higher-order doubts should believe. This would be an 
odd omission, since disagreeing peers make us have such doubts.  
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disagreement to demand that it include a complete recipe for undoing every epistemic 
mistake one might be making... (Christensen 2011, p. 4)  
 
If Conciliationism is silent about what credences agents should have, then EB appears to 
be misguided. On this thought, Conciliationism is merely a view about the proper 
response to one piece of evidence, or a view about the amount of revision called for by 
the disagreement on its own, and not a view about how to find an all-things-considered 
rational belief in any given disagreement. 
 As with Weak Conciliationism, it is not clear what conciliatory requirement follows 
when we take conciliating to merely be the correct response to one bit of evidence. 
Cohen (2013) suggests that Christensen may have a wide-scope requirement in mind:  
 
Wide-Scope Conciliationism: One ought to see to it that if one has credence c1 
in p (given evidence E), and c1 differs from a peer’s credence c2 in p (given 
E), then one conciliate to an intermediate credence c3. 
 
Having the entire conditional in the scope of the normative operator allows for two 
ways of complying with the requirement. We could comply with Wide-Scope 
Conciliationism either by falsifying its antecedent or by satisfying its consequent. 
Conciliating to c3 would make the consequent true, while any change to our credence in 
p (given E) would make the antecedent false.24 Note that any such change that is not a 
change all the way to the peer’s credence c2 would invite a new instance of the rule, only 
with different values for c1 and c3. So to comply with Wide-Scope Conciliationism once 
                                                
24  Since the discussion here concerns the rational response to disagreement, we should leave out more creative 
ways of falsifying the antecedent, like killing our peers.  
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and for all, at some point we would have to either conciliate or conform to our peer’s 
view. This makes three routes of belief-revision available to us if we are to comply with 
Wide-Scope Conciliationism in a way that prevents its recurrence. We could conciliate 
from our credence, or revise our credence in p (given E) so as to conform to our peer’s 
credence, or revise our credence in p (given E) and then conciliate from that new 
credence.  
 The wide-scope reading of Conciliationism appears to fit Christensen’s description 
of agents who conciliate as taking correct account of one bit of evidence. If an initially 
irrational agent conciliates in the face of disagreement, then by doing so she 
successfully avoids violating a wide-scope requirement. The view also doubly avoids a 
bootstrapping charge. Complying with the requirement does not guarantee that those 
who conciliate reach a rational credence, nor does it tell agents who have irrational 
credences to conciliate. In stating a mere necessary condition for believing rationally, 
and in staying silent about which way of complying with it is rationally required, Wide-
Scope Conciliationism leaves it for other rational requirements to determine what the 
all-things-considered rational response is to each disagreement.  
 Yet in its silence about which way of complying with the rule is rationally required 
in which situations, Wide-Scope Conciliationism leaves obscure how we should 
respond to a disagreeing peer. It does not tell us who, if anyone, should satisfy the 
consequent and conciliate, and who should do something else.25 Plausibly, when an 
agent is the irrational party, the only rational way for her to satisfy Wide-Scope 
Conciliationism would be to do something other than conciliate from her irrational 
                                                
25  Note that this expectation of Wide-Scope Conciliationism does not presuppose that the rule should tell us how to 
undo all possible epistemic mistakes, but only that it tell us who should conciliate. 
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credence. Any account that includes Wide-Scope Conciliationism must grant this, if the 
account is to avoid EB. But this also leaves agents who have a rational credence as the 
only candidates for those who are rationally required to comply with rule by 
conciliating. So it seems that on a reasonable understanding of how Wide-Scope 
Conciliationism fits with other rational requirements, it is still only those with rational 
credences who must conciliate when facing a disagreeing peer. For this reason, here too 
we could resist the rule with No Motivation and the related inconsistency in rationally 
believing that we complied with the rule as we should have.26 
 Wide-Scope Conciliationism is not concerned with how other rational requirements 
constrain the way that we should comply with it. But when we consider those other 
requirements, and remember that EB is a looming threat, we see that Wide-Scope 
Conciliationism could only fit into a picture that reserves the need to conciliate 
exclusively to those who have a rational credence. The wide-scope interpretation of 
Conciliationism as merely necessary effectively reduces to the restricted version of 
Conciliationism.  
 The fact that we may come to realize past mistakes seems to cause trouble for a 
narrow-scope interpretation of Conciliationism as necessary. Going wide-scope appears 
to lead to a previously discussed dead end. Another possibility is to stick to a narrow-
scope conciliatory view, and try to make it fit with the rationality of fixing our irrational 
credences. The next two responses to EB are such attempts. 
 
 
                                                
26  Unlike with Restricted Conciliationism, it would not always be irrational to believe that we complied with Wide-
Scope Conciliationism rationally. For instance, Fixit could rationally believe that she did so. But it would still be 
irrational for anyone who conciliates to believe that they complied with Wide-Scope Conciliationism rationally.  
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3.2  The dilemma response 
When discussing disagreement about disagreement, Christensen (2013) concludes that 
in certain situations epistemic requirements conflict:  
 
…the fact that there is this tension among our epistemic ideals need not mean that any 
of them is incorrect. It might just mean that in certain situations (in particular, when one 
gets good evidence against the correctness of what are in fact the correct ideals), one will 
end up violating some ideal or other, no matter what one ends up believing. 
(Christensen 2013, p. 91) 
 
We could extend this line to make for a response to EB, and say that when an irrational 
agent enters into a disagreement she faces a genuine epistemic dilemma.27 Call this the 
Dilemma Response. 
 According to the Dilemma Response, when an agent S enters into a disagreement 
holding an irrational credence, a conflict between rational requirements arises.28 On the 
one hand, S would be required to conciliate with her peer from that irrational credence. 
On the other hand, and since conciliating would not carry S to a rational credence (per 
EB), S would be rationally required to do something other than conciliate. So, initially 
irrational agents would violate some rational requirement no matter what doxastic 
revision they make. These agents would be in a genuine rational dilemma. 
 We should take the conflict in this context to be between necessary rather than 
sufficient conditions for believing rationally. If we take both conditions to be sufficient 
then satisfying either would suffice for reaching a fully rational belief, thus exposing the 
                                                
27  I thank Brian Weatherson for this point. 
28  On this account, rationality sometimes requires that we have an irrational credence.  
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view to EB. Alternatively, taking one to be sufficient and the other necessary would be 
incoherent. If by satisfying the sufficient condition one could reach a fully rational 
credence then following the other would not be necessary after all. But if both are 
necessary for having a rational credence then we get a genuine dilemma. No matter 
what S does, she would fall short of doing all that is rationally required of her. When no 
path to a fully rational credence is available to S then no easy path is available either, 
and EB is not a concern. 
 How bad is it to have Conciliationism imply rational dilemmas? If Christensen is 
right, dilemmas are already part of doxastic life, so adding a few more instances where 
they arise might not be so bad. What does look bad is that the Dilemma Response 
implies that rational dilemmas arise even on occasions where agents can apparently 
escape them with perfectly rational beliefs. Recall the case of Fixed Mistakes. If Fixit 
notices her past mistakes and corrects it by reasoning from her total evidence, she 
would arrive at a fully rational belief. So here too, as with Necessary Conciliationism, 
there is reason to doubt that conciliating is truly necessary for acquiring a rational 
belief, contrary to the Dilemma Response. 
 On the Dilemma Response, if Fixit notices her past mistake and comes to agree with 
her peer that c2 is the justified credence, she would violate some rational requirement. 
Since Fixit reasons correctly from her total evidence to a belief supported by that 
evidence, it is hard to see what that violation would be. Perhaps one could argue that 
Fixit violates an alleged diachronic requirement of rational belief transition. For 
example, one might say that she violates the Bayesian updating rule, which sanctions as 
rational only belief revisions made by conditionalizing on new evidence. But the 
Bayesian model applies only to ideally rational agents, and does not tell irrational 
agents how to fix their mistakes. However, EB concerns just those cases where agents 
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have made errors of rationality. The Bayesian model is silent on how such agents 
should revise, and cannot be of help here. 
 Moreover, while proponents of the Dilemma Response might suggest some other 
respect in which it is rationally criticizable to fix past errors in judgment, the opposite 
should strike us as true. An agent who recognizes past errors does precisely the right 
thing, and in precisely the right way. It is surely wrong to maintain that an agent who 
forms an irrational belief and then fixes it by reasoning correctly from her evidence 
makes two rational mistakes—first in forming the irrational belief, and then in fixing 
the error.  
 
3.3  The different ‘ought’ response  
Another response to EB that is friendly to the idea that conciliation is only necessary can 
be derived from Miriam Schoenfield’s discussion of Calibrationism: 
 
We should not think of calibrationism as a principle of epistemic rationality, where such 
principles are understood as principles about the relationship between bodies of 
evidence and belief states. Rather, we should think of calibrationism as a principle of 
reasoning. I am understanding principles of reasoning as principles about which 
transitions of thought, or reasoning processes, should occur in the process of 
deliberation. (Schoenfield 2014, pp. 452-3) 
 
If we adapt Schoenfield’s idea to Conciliationism we get a view on which conciliating is 
required by the rules of correct reasoning. We can capture the point by swapping 
‘rationality’ for ‘correct reasoning’ in Naïve Conciliationism: 
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Reasoning Conciliationism: If one has credence c1 in p, and one encounters a 
peer who has a different credence c2 in p, then correct reasoning requires 
one to conciliate to an intermediate credence c3. 
 
On Reasoning Conciliationism, conciliating in a peer disagreement is a requirement of 
correct reasoning rather than a requirement of rationality. This means that in cases of 
disagreement conciliation is required even if the resulting credence would not be 
rational. Thus, although conciliation is required, a rational credence is not guaranteed 
for those who conciliate, and the view avoids EB. 
 Schoenfield’s suggestion is straightforwardly usable as a response to EB. While 
rationality may require us to revise our beliefs one way, correct reasoning may require 
us to revise another way, and no conflict between rational requirements would arise. 
The basic move is to distinguish between different kinds of requirements, or different 
senses of ‘ought,’ and say that Conciliationism derives from a normative requirement 
that is not a rational requirement.29 Since the conciliatory requirement on this view is 
not a rational requirement, the view is safe from EB. The view looks preferable to the 
Dilemma Response, because the requirements said to conflict do not appear to give rise 
to a rational dilemma. 
 An initial concern with Reasoning Conciliationism is that the view multiplies kinds 
of normative requirements (or senses of ‘ought’) beyond necessity. Correct reasoning 
certainly seems like a kind of rational requirement, as it is often necessary for believing 
rationally. If an agent acquires a belief by reasoning incorrectly from the evidence, her 
                                                
29  Worsnip (2018) discusses a similar distinction between oughts of evidence-responsiveness and oughts of 
coherence. Distinguishing rational requirements from requirements of accuracy is another possibility here. For a 
related discussion see Schoenfield (2018). 
 25 
 
belief would typically not be rational, even if the evidence justifies that belief. But 
defenders of Reasoning Conciliationism cannot grant that conciliation is necessary for 
rational belief, on pain of having the view reduce to Necessary Conciliationism (and 
deem necessary what looks like unnecessary belief revision in Fixed Mistakes).  
 A more serious concern is that the normative domain of reasoning requirements is 
obscure. If reasoning requirements are kinds of rational requirements, Reasoning 
Conciliationism would reduce to Naïve Conciliationism, Necessary Conciliationism, or 
the Dilemma Response. If reasoning requirements are not kinds of rational 
requirements, we would be rationally required to ignore them when revising our 
beliefs. Different normative domains may require us to believe various things that are in 
conflict with what rationality requires. For instance, morality may require us to believe 
that a family member is innocent of a crime well past the point where the evidence 
suggests otherwise. But such a requirement does not speak to what is rational to 
believe, and so we are rationally required to ignore it in rational belief formation. 
Unless the requirement to conciliate is in service of rationality—a position that 
proponents of Reasoning Conciliationism must reject—it is unclear what could make 
ignoring it irrational. 
 Perhaps defenders of Reasoning Conciliationism could insist that we do away with 
traditional talk of rational requirements, and replace it with talk of evidential 
requirements and reasoning requirements. Taking evidential and reasoning 
requirements to represent their own respective normative domains would separate 
Reasoning Conciliationism from other views considered so far, thus avoiding the initial 
concern I mentioned. Eliminating talk of rationality would also allow the view to avoid 
the second concern, namely, that rationality requires us to ignore reasoning 
requirements if those are not rational requirements. Nevertheless, even on such a 
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revisionary view, the two allegedly distinct kinds of requirement would not be distinct 
enough. Just as correctly reasoning from rational beliefs ensures that we arrive at 
further rational beliefs, correctly reasoning from evidentially supported beliefs ensures 
that we arrive at further evidentially supported beliefs. Indeed, correct reasoning seems 
valuable only insofar as it allows us to reach evidentially supported beliefs. Thus, 
whenever a conflict between evidential requirements and reasoning requirements 
would arise, the former would trump. If entering into a disagreement with an irrational 
belief creates conflict between the domains, the reasoning requirement to conciliate 
would lose. 
 Similar dialectical moves are available in response to other interpretations of 
Conciliationism that take it to employ a different normative operator than that of 
rationality. If the proposed conciliatory requirement is a kind of rational requirement, 
the corresponding view would reduce to one of the previously discussed responses to 
EB. If the proposed requirement is not a kind of rational requirement, we would be 
rational to ignore it. If complying with the proposed requirement is conducive to 
complying with rational requirements, rational requirements would win in cases of 
conflict.  
 There is one more important construal of Conciliationism that coheres with the 
thought that conciliation is only necessary for believing rationally. I count this construal 
as a distinct kind of answer to EB, since it addresses the epistemic significance of 
disagreement in the more general context of the rational response to our total evidence.  
 
4 Conciliationism and total evidence 
The disagreement debate has led some to provide accounts that tell us what belief 
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anyone who encounters disagreement should have all-things-considered.30 Christensen 
(2016) suggests the following:  
 
Idealized Thermometer Model: The credence in C it would be rational for the 
agent to form, given all her evidence, is the credence in C that would be 
rational! independent of C’s support from first-order considerations, 
conditional on a relevantly similar agent adopting credence n in C on the 
basis of first-order support from the agent’s evidence.31  
 
Christensen mentions Kelly’s EB worry after offering the Idealized Thermometer 
Model, and says that the model “puts rational credences” where traditional 
Conciliationism “had the agent’s actual initial credences.” So, while the Standard 
Thermometer Model orders agents who disagree to conciliate from their starting 
credences, the Idealized Thermometer Model orders them to conciliate from the 
credence that the pre-disagreement evidence justifies. 
 Rules like the Idealized Thermometer Model describe how everyone should weigh 
information about their expected reliability 32  against their other evidence. 33  Since 
                                                
30  See Sliwa and Horowitz (2015), Christensen (2016).  
31  Here Christensen assumes n to be the rational credence to have given one’s first-order considerations. He also 
assumes takes ‘relevantly similar’ to mean “someone who is similar with respect to the reliability evidence the 
agent has about herself.”  
32  Sliwa and Horowitz (2015) use similar terminology, and define ‘expected reliability’ as one’s expected 
propensity to guess correctly. 
33  More generally, these accounts tell us how to weigh our first-order evidence against our evidence regarding 
what that first-order evidence supports (i.e., against our higher-order evidence). See Christensen (2010) and Kelly 
(2010) for discussions of higher-order evidence. 
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disagreement plausibly provides information of this sort, these rules include the 
rational response to disagreement. We may describe conciliatory rules that take this 
approach as sharing a general schema: 
 
Total Evidence Conciliationism: The credence that agent S should have in p is 
that which S’s pre-disagreement evidence justifies, properly modified by 
the reliability evidence introduced by a disagreeing peer’s view. 
 
 Rules that take our total evidence into account (hereafter, ‘total evidence rules’) 
cannot be accused of allowing easy bootstrapping. In order to follow them correctly an 
agent has to give enough weight to what the pre-disagreement evidence in fact 
supports, as opposed to what her own view is. As a result, these rules are far from easy 
to follow, and do not license two irrational agents to simply move toward one another 
and call it a day. Note that total evidence rules will not always recommend that agents 
move toward their peers. The total evidence may justify a relatively high credence even 
when both peers initially have irrationally low ones. In such cases, one of the agents 
would have to revise in a direction opposite to that of her peer’s credence. But as long 
as a total evidence rule recommends that we give equal (or substantial) weight to the 
initial credences of all the relevant parties, it would be conciliatory in an important 
respect. In addition, total evidence rules can tell us something substantive about how 
evidence regarding our reliability (like disagreement) figures into rational belief.34 They 
can do this by telling us how to weigh each kind of evidence. If so, total evidence rules 
may also avoid the charge of not providing insight into, or guidance about the rational 
                                                
34  See Leydon-Hardy (2016) for one such concern. 
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response to disagreement. Total evidence rules are not simply repeating the 
evidentialist mantra to believe what all of our evidence supports, even if they do not tell 
us precisely what our total evidence supports in every case. 
 Despite its advantages, Total Evidence Conciliationism still shares a lot with 
Restricted Conciliationism, including its main problems. Recall that the good news 
about Conciliationism came from its promise to help us hedge our doxastic bets. But 
including a need to correctly assess the pre-disagreement evidence anywhere in a 
conciliatory account again seems to get the motivation for conciliating backwards. 
Complying with the account would be even harder than believing what the pre-
disagreement evidence alone supports. If Total Evidence Conciliationism is true, and if 
we struggle to rationally believe what the pre-disagreement evidence supports, we 
would be even less likely to rationally believe what our total evidence supports.35 Here 
too (as with Restricted Conciliationism), this initial oddity is indicative of another issue, 
namely, that there is an inconsistency in following Total Evidence Conciliationism 
correctly and rationally believing that we did.36 For suppose that we come to rationally 
believe that some version of Total Evidence Conciliationism is the right rule, and we 
also rationally believe that we followed the rule correctly. Believing that would seem to 
entail believing that we followed the rule’s steps correctly. This includes believing that 
                                                
35  It could be that agents who try to evaluate the pre-disagreement evidence alone will tend to end up with 
credences that are further away from what that evidence supports than if they tried to follow Total Evidence 
Conciliationism. That would only show is that, in some prudential sense, we may be better off trying to follow a 
conciliatory strategy than not. This kind of benefit does not typically figure into rational requirements. Many 
things that we can do to help ourselves come closer to what our evidence supports (like staying hydrated, 
getting enough sleep, or triple-checking our reasoning) are not rationally required. 
36  Sliwa and Horowitz (2015) raise a similar issue with their Evidential Calibration principle. Christensen (2016) 
applies the objection to the Idealized Thermometer Model, and offers a response I soon discuss.  
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we correctly identified what the pre-disagreement evidence supports. But if we 
rationally believe that we correctly identified what the pre-disagreement evidence 
supports, we should form the corresponding credence, and not modify it in any way. In 
other words, we would have to roll back whatever changes we made to the credence 
that the pre-disagreement evidence justifies. So, believing that we followed the rule 
correctly is inconsistent with maintaining its recommended credence. The alternatives 
of disbelieving or suspending judgment about whether we followed Total Evidence 
Conciliationism correctly would again seem to conflict with a key motivation for 
conciliatory views, namely, resolving the akratic tension in having a belief and at the 
same time having serious doubts that the belief is rational. 
 Christensen defends the Idealized Thermometer Model from the charge of 
sanctioning epistemic akrasia:  
 
Epistemic akrasia is not, per se, a problem at all. Thinking that a belief of yours is 
irrational in a particular way should disturb you—that is, give you a reason to change 
that belief—only insofar as the particular irrationality indicates that a different belief 
would have greater expected accuracy. (Christensen 2016, p. 416) 
 
Applying the idea to the issue at hand, it must be that we should comply with Total 
Evidence Conciliationism and either disbelieve that we did—i.e., believe that the 
credence we end up with is irrational—or suspend judgment on the matter. In both 
cases we would have serious justified doubts that our credence is rational, but we could 
also maintain that credence rationally.37 
                                                
37  I understand Christensen’s response to amount to a defense of akrasia as rationally permitted in the relevant 
situations. Only if akrasia is not a rationality problem in those situations then we should sometimes be akratic.  
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 Had it not been irrational to hold on to a belief despite reason to think that it is 
irrational, we might expect there to be little pressure to change our beliefs due to 
disagreeing peers. On Christensen’s view, though, aversion to akratic tensions may not 
be the source of this pressure. The pressure to change a belief due to disagreement may 
instead be coming from the fact that disagreement gives us reason to think that a 
different belief than ours has greater expected accuracy.38  
 Be that as it may, allowing a kind of rational akrasia seems to lead to a contradiction. 
Grant for the sake of the argument that akrasia is not, per se, a problem, and that 
rationality indeed requires that we maximize something like expected accuracy. If the 
Idealized Thermometer Model (or some other total evidence rule) gives rise to rational 
instances of akrasia, we may either rationally disbelieve that we followed it correctly, or 
suspend judgment on the matter, despite following it correctly. For that to be true, it 
must be that we lack sufficient reason to believe that a different credence than the one 
we ended up with has greater expected accuracy—or our akratic state would not be 
rational. But if we know that rationality requires maximizing expected accuracy, and we 
should not believe that a different credence than ours does better on the accuracy front, 
then we should believe that we did all that rationality requires of us. This would entail 
believing that we followed all of the genuine rational requirements that we are under, 
including the Idealized Thermometer Model. So we start with the assumption that we 
should disbelieve that (or suspend judgment about whether) we followed the rule 
correctly, and conclude that we should believe that we did. Thus, granting that rules 
like the Idealized Thermometer Model sanction akratic doxastic attitudes lands us in a 
                                                
38  The upcoming discussion of akrasia does not rest on some particular understanding of ‘expected accuracy.’ See 
Schoenfield (2015b) for a standard definition of ‘expected accuracy.’  
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contradiction, where in some cases we both should and should not believe that we 
followed the rule correctly. 
 The thought here is similar to one already mentioned when discussion the different 
‘ought’ response to EB. Rational beliefs and accurate beliefs cannot be in competition 
with one another over what we should believe. What we should believe just is what is 
rational to believe, even if what this amounts to is that which has greatest expected 
accuracy. It is therefore incoherent to believe that a belief of ours is irrational while also 
thinking that we should have it for the sake of accuracy. The relevant ‘should’ has to be 
that of rational belief, if it is to have any normative bite in this context. If it is not the 
‘should’ of rational belief, it would be unclear what kind of requirement it is, and why 
we would not be rational to ignore it.  
 
5 The upshot for Conciliationism 
The Easy Bootstrapping argument shows that the pursuit of a conciliatory procedure to 
follow in cases of disagreement has to be sensitive to the possibility that we enter into a 
disagreement with an irrational credence. Since correct procedures only give good 
outputs when fed good inputs, agents who simply conciliate from an irrational 
credence will not reach an all-things-considered rational one. 
 It is a lot to expect a concise rule about disagreement to guide all agents in undoing 
their past mistakes before conciliating. This observation, however, is not grounds for 
dismissing the bootstrapping concern. The challenge facing conciliationists is to tell us 
how to conceive of the conciliatory requirement so that it does not allow bootstrapping, 
and is still epistemically substantive. We have seen three kinds of ways conciliationists 
attempt to meet this challenge: restricting Conciliationism only to rational agents, 
 33 
 
treating Conciliationism as necessary but not sufficient for fully rational beliefs, and 
weighing what our pre-disagreement evidence supports against the evidence 
introduced by the disagreement.  
 When we restrict Conciliationism, we are left with a bizarre rational requirement. A 
conciliatory view that requires only those who responded to their evidence rationally to 
conciliate misses its mark. When we treat Conciliationism as merely necessary for 
rational belief, we are left wondering how an agent should revise her beliefs when 
encountering disagreement. Since this is the central puzzle in the peer disagreement 
debate, a view that says nothing more than that is unsatisfying. Some apparently 
promising ways of developing the idea suggest themselves: Necessary Conciliationism, 
Wide Scope Conciliationism and Reasoning Conciliationism. But these suggestions face 
serious problems. They either reduce to Restricted Conciliationism, or deem necessary 
an unnecessary doxastic revision, or can be rationally ignored. A further move available 
to conciliationists is to bite the bullet and admit that Conciliationism sometimes leads to 
genuine conflicts between rational requirements. This approach has the implausible 
result that fixing our past mistakes is at least partly irrational.  
 Finally, total evidence rules may seem viable for telling us how disagreement affects 
rational beliefs. Still, if such rules are to avoid a bootstrapping problem, they end up 
facing challenges similar to those that Conciliationism faces when restricted to rational 
agents only. Primarily, these rules secure akratic tensions between our doxastic 
attitudes, and treating these tensions as rational leads to a contradiction. 
 It is not just Conciliationism that is vulnerable to EB. Other alleged rules about the 
correct response to information about our rationality are open to the charge. Consider, 
for example, a rule that requires agents to reduce their confidence in p by some degree 
upon learning that they tend to overestimate matters like p. EB would apply to such a 
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rule just as it does to Conciliationism, and attempts to have the rule avoid the charge 
would send us down a dialectical path parallel to the one followed in this paper. This is 
some reason for thinking that we could use the arguments in this paper as part of a 
broader, steadfast project. Such a project would not need to involve denial of the 
compelling intuition that we should take seriously signs of our rational shortcomings.39 
But the way to take those signs seriously cannot be with a blanket revision of the 
credences that we happen to have. 
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